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This  paper  studies  the  implications  for  general  equilibnum  asset  pricing  of  a class  of  Kreps-Porteus 
nonexpected  utility  preferences  characterized  by  a  constant  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution 
and  a  constant,  but  unrelated,  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion.  It  is  shown  that  relaxing  the 
parametric  restriction  on  tastes  imposed  by  the  time-additive  expected  utility  specification  does 
not  suffice  to  solve  the  Mehra-Prescott  (1985)  equity  premium  puzzle.  An  additional  puzzle  -  the 
risk-free  rate  puzzle  -  emerges  instead:  why  is  the  risk-free  rate  so  low  if  agents  are  so  averse  to 
intertemporal  substitution? 
1.  Introduction 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  study  the  implications  for  general  equilib- 
rium  asset  pricing  of  the  parametric  class  of  Kreps-Porteus  nonexpected 
utility  preferences  introduced  recently  by  Epstein  and  Zin  (1987a,  b)  and 
myself  [Weil  (1987)l.l  These  preferences  generalize,  in  a  nonexpected  utility 
framework,  the  commonly  used  time-additive,  isoelastic  expected  utility  speci- 
fication  to  allow  for  an  independent  parametrization  of  attitudes  toward  risk 
and  attitudes  toward  intertemporal  substitution.  They  are  characterized  by  a 
constant  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  and  a  constant,  but  unrelated, 
coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion,  and  thus  relax  the  well-known  constraint 
intrinsic  to  time-additive,  isoelastic  expected  utility  that  the  intemporal  elastic- 
ity  of  substitution  be  the  inverse  of  the  constant  coefficient  of  relative  risk 
aversion. 
Adopting  this  new  class  of  preferences  has  clear  benefits.  Firstly,  these 
preferences  do  not  impose  a behavioral  restriction  on  tastes  which  is  devoid  of 
*I  thank  Roger  Farmer  and  RaJnish  Mehra  for  helpful  discussions,  participants  in  the  July  1988 
NBER  Summer  Institute  and  in  many  workshops  for  useful  comments,  and  the  National  Science 
Foundation  (SES-8823040)  for  financial  support. 
‘See  Kreps  and  Porteus  (1978,  1979a,  b)  for  the  axiomatic  foundations  of  these  preferences. 
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any  theoretical  rationale  and  which  has  many  unpleasant  side-effects.’ 
Secondly,  the  data  seem  to  reject  the  time-additive  expected  utility  restriction, 
as  established  by  Epstein  and  Zin  (1987b)  and  Giovannini  and  Weil  (1988). 
Thirdly,  from  an  analytical  point  of  view,  this  class  of  Kreps-Porteus  prefer- 
ences  is  very  simple  to  work  with  and  a  very  natural  generalization  of 
isoelastic  preferences  to  uncertainty. 
In  spite  of  these  advantages,  it  is  legitimate  and  necessary  to  wonder 
whether  these  new  preferences  contribute,  even  partially,  to  the  resolution  of 
any  the  many  outstanding  asset  pricing  or  consumption  theory  puzzles.  Do 
these  puzzles  disappear  once  preferences  are  ‘correctly’  specified  and  the 
expected,  time-additive  utility  restriction  lifted?  Can  we  conclude  that  the  role 
we  had  attributed,  in  the  empirical  difficulties  of  frictionless  asset  pricing  or 
permanent  income  theories,  to  incomplete  markets  or  liquidity  constraints  was 
misplaced,  and  that  the  only  problem  was  in  reality  one  of  misspecification  of 
preferences?  It  would  be  surprising  that  the  answer  to  these  purposefully 
provocative  questions  be  positive  -  and  indeed  it  is  not,  as  this  paper  will 
suggest. 
The  test  to  which  this  study  submits  this  new  parametric  class  of  nonex- 
petted  utility  preferences  is  the  now  standard  one  devised  by  Mehra  and 
Prescott  (1985):  can  an  artificial  representative  agent  economy,  calibrated  with 
plausible  parameter  values  and  output  process,  replicate  the  average  secular 
level  of  the  risk-free  rate  (0.75%)  and  of  the  risk  premium  on  equity  (6.20%)? 
We  know,  from  Mehra  and  Prescott’s  original  work,  that  a  representative 
agent  economy  with  CES,  time-additive,  expected  utility  preferences  and 
complete  markets  cannot  pass  this  test  -  because  of  the  inability  of  the  model 
to  fit  both  the  level  of  the  risk-free  rate  and  the  discrepancy  between  the  safe 
and  average  risky  rates.  Does,  however,  an  economy  in  which  agents  are 
endowed  with  the  Kreps-Porteus  generalization  of  CES  preferences  perform 
substantially  better  with  respect  to  the  Mehra-Prescott  touchstone?  While 
intuition  suggests  that  it  might  -  these  new  preferences  afford  an  additional 
degree  of  freedom  -  the  answer  to  this  question  is  negative. 
As  I  demonstrate  below,  the  risk  premium  depends,  for  plausible  calibra- 
tions  of  tastes  and  technology,  almost  exclusively  on  the  coefficient  of  relative 
risk  aversion.  But  this  implies  that  relaxing  the  time-additive  expected  utility 
restriction  on  tastes  does  not  substantially  alter  the  fact,  documented  by 
Mehra  and  Prescott,  that  the  model  can  replicate  the  risk  premium  only  for 
astronomically  high  levels  of  risk  aversion  -  thus  leaving  the  equity  premium 
‘Among  them  figure  prommently:  (i)  the  impossibihty  of  replicatmg  the  behavior  of  agents  who 
are  both  moderately  risk-averse  and  yet  very  averse  to  intertemporal  substitution  (as  most 
available  empirical  evrdence  suggests  is  the  case),  and  (u)  the  difficulty,  pomted  out  by  Hall  (1985) 
of  determining  whether  regressions  of  log  growth  rates  of  consumptron  on  mean  log  real  interest 
rates  provide  an  estimate  of  risk  aversion  or  intertemporal  substitution  [see  Well  (1987)  on  this 
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puzzle  intact:  there  is  simply  not  enough  aggregate  risk  in  the  model  to 
replicate  the  risk  premium  for  plausibly  risk-averse  consumers.  What  emerges 
instead  from  the  relaxation  of  this  restriction  and  the  appropriate  calibration 
of  tastes  is,  as  we  shall  see,  an  additional  puzzle,  centered  around  the  risk-free 
rate:  why  is  it,  if  consumers  are  as  averse  to  intertemporal  substitution  as  some 
recent  estimates  suggest,  that  the  risk-free  rate  is  so  low? 
Epstein’s  (1988)  model  -  a  Lucas  tree  economy  peopled  by  consumers  with 
Kreps-Porteus  preferences  -  is  very  similar  to  the  one  developed  here.  While 
the  issues  that  he  and  I  address  are  clearly  related,  they  are  distinct.  His  is  a 
comparative  statics  study  of  the  effects  of  risk  aversion  equilibrium  asset  prices 
in  an  economy  with  i.i.d.  uncertainty,  while  my  goal  is  to  compare  the 
equilibrium  returns  predicted  by  the  model  with  historical  data,  and  thus  to 
provide  a  touchstone  to  evaluate  the  model. 
The  analysis  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  model,  and  solves 
for  equilibrium  asset  prices  and  rates  of  return.  Section  3 establishes  the  main 
result  of  the  paper:  separating  risk  aversion  from  intertemporal  substitution 
cannot,  on  its  own,  explain  away  the  equity  premium  puzzle  documented  by 
Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985).  but  instead  highlights  the  existence  of  a  risk-free 
rate  puzzle.  The  conclusion  summarizes  the  paper  and  outlines  directions  for 
further  research. 
2.  The  basic  framework 
The  economy  is  similar,  except  for  the  agents’  preferences,  to  the  one 
studied  by  Lucas  (1978)  and  Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985).  I  first  describe 
technology  and  consumer  behavior,  and  then  compute  equilibrium  asset 
returns. 
2.1,  Technology 
There  is  one  perishable  consumption  good,  a  fruit,  which  is  produced  by 
nonreproducible  identical  trees  whose  number  is  normalized,  without  loss  of 
generality,  to  be  equal  to  the  size  of  the  constant  population.  Let  y,  denote  the 
number  of  fruits  falling  from  a tree  at  time  t,  i.e.,  the  dividend  associated  with 
holding  a  tree.  It  is  assumed  that  the  rate  of  growth  of  dividends,  A,,,  = 
y,+i/y,.  is  random  and  Markovian  over  a  finite  state  space,  with  transition 
probabilities  given  by 3 
with  i,  j  =  1,2,.  . . , Z -C cc,  A, >  0,  and  c~=i+,,  =  1,  Vi.  The  uncertainty  on 
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dividends  at  t +  1,  and  thus  on  y,+i/y,,  is  assumed  to  be  resolved  at  the 
beginning  of  period  t +  1,  before  time  t +  1  consumption  and  savings  deci- 
sions  are  made. 
2.2.  Consumers 
The  economy  is  inhabited  by  many  identical  infinitely-lived  consumers.  Let 
pt,  x,,  and  c,  denote,  respectively,  the  fruit  price  of  a  tree  at  t,  the  number  of 
(shares  of)  trees  held  at  the  beginning  of  period  t,  and  consumption  at  t  of  a 
representative  agent.  The  one-period  budget  constraint  facing  a  representative 
consumer  is  then  simply 
c,+P,x,+l=  (P,+Y,bt,  t 2  0,  (2) 
with  x0>  0  given.  Letting  R,+i  =  [ p,+ 1 + y,,  J/p,  denote  the  one-period 
(random)  rate  of  return  on  a  tree  and  rvI  =  ( pr + v,)x,  represent  beginning-of- 
period  wealth.  the  budget  constraint  (2)  can  be  rewritten  more  compactly  as 
wr+1=  fc+,b,  -  4  (3) 
I  assume  that  agents  are  not  indifferent  to  the  timing  of  the  resolution  of 
uncertainty  on  temporal  lotteries  [as  they  are  when  preferences  can  be  repre- 
sented  by  a  Von  Neumann-Morgenstern  (VNM)  utility  index]  and  that  their 
preference  ordering  can  be  represented  recursively  as 
v,=  Lk,E,Y+i],  (4 
where  E,  denotes  expectation  conditional  on  information  available  at  t.4 
The  aggregator  function  U[.,  .] is  given  by 
qc, VI 
= 
{ (1  _  p)cl-p  +  p  [l  +  (1  -  P)(l  _  y)v](l-~~~(‘-y)}(l-y)‘(l-p)  -  1 
(1 -P)(l  -Y> 
(5) 
a  parametrization  of  Kreps-Porteus  preferences  which,  as  Epstein  and  Zin 
(1987a)  and  Weil  (1987)  have  independently  shown,  provides  a  generalization 
%ee  Kreps  and  Porteus  (1978,  1979a,  b)  for  an  exposition of  the  axiomatic  foundations  of  these 
preferences,  and  Attanasio  and  Weber  (1989),  Epstein  and  Zin  (1987a,  b),  Epstein  (1988),  Farmer 
(1989).  Giovannini  and  Weil  (1988).  and  Weil  (1987)  for  specific  parametrizations  and  macroeco- 
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of  isoelastic  utility  which  disentangles  attitudes  toward  intertemporal  substitu- 
tion  and  from  behavior  toward  risk  aversion.5 
The  parameter  p >  0  represents  the  inverse  of  the  (constant)  elasticity  of 
intertemporal  substitution,  y >  0  is  the  Arrow-Pratt  (constant)  coefficient  of 
relative  aversion  for  static  gambles,  and  p  E  (0,l)  measures  the  subjective 
discount  factor  under  certainty.  6  The  VNM  time-additive  expected  utility 
specification  emerges,  up  to  a monotone  transformation,  as  the  special  case  in 
which  y =  p,  i.e.,  as  the  special  case  in  which  the  coefficient  of  relative  risk 
aversion  is  restricted  to  be  the  inverse  of  the  elasticity  of  intertemporal 
substitution. 
To  characterize  the  optimal  consumption  plan  of  the  representative  con- 
sumer,  denote  by  V( w,, A,)  the  maximum  utility  attainable  by  an  agent  who 
has  wealth  w  when  the  state  of  nature  at  t,  summarized  by  the  realized  growth 
rate  of  dividends,  is  X,.  This  value  function  is  the  solution  to  the  following 
functional  equation: 
V(w,,  h,)  =  maxU[c,,E,V(w,+,,  A,,,)]  subject  to  (3).  (6) 
CI 
This  functional  equation  of  course  reduces  to  the  standard  linear  Bellman 
equation  in  the  time-additive  case  y =  p.  The  first-order  condition  for  the 
maximization  problem  in  (6)  is  simply 
where  U,,  denotes  the  derivative  of  the  aggregator  function  with  respect  to  its 
i th  argument  (i  =  1,2)  evaluated  at  (c,,  E,V,+ t),  and  V,,  the  derivative  of  the 
value  function  with  respect  to  wealth  evaluated  at  (w,,  X,).  Using  the  envelope 
theorem  and  (7)  one  finds 
Notice,  from  eq.  (8),  that  while  it  remains  true,  with  Kreps-Porteus  prefer- 
ences,  that  an  optimum  program  is  characterized  by  the  equalization  of  the 
marginal  utility  of  wealth,  Vu,  to  the  marginal  utility  of  consumption,  Ur,,’  the 
latter  depends  (unless  utility  is  time-additive)  on  expected  future  value.  For 
our  consumer,  changes  in  the  marginal  utility  of  wealth  do  not  solely  reflect,  in 
‘The  special  cases  p +  1  and  y  +  1  can  be  dealt  with  by  applying  de  I’Hospttal’s  rule  to  the 
aggregator  function  (5)  Epstem  (1988)  chooses  instead  to  write  separate  utility  functions  for  these 
special  cases. 
6Under  uncertamty,  the  subjective  discount  factor,  0;  =  au/l/aV,  1s  in  general  time-  and 
state-dependent:  Kreps-Porteus  preferences  are  a  stochastic  generalization  of  endogenous  time 
preference. 
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an  optimal  plan,  changes  in  nondurable  consumption,  but  also  changes  in 
expected  future  utility.  Kreps-Porteus  preferences  thus  introduce  an  effect 
very  similar,  at  a  formal  level,  to  the  one  which  would  be  associated  with 
nonseparabilities  in  consumer  durables  or  government  purchases.  This  is  the 
reason  why  they  are,  a priori,  a  good  candidate  for  explaining  asset  pricing  or 
consumption  theory  puzzles. 
Substituting  (8)  into  (7)  yields  the  following  Euler  equation: 
Et 
i 
wJ1*+  1 
R 
4 
t+1  = 
1 
1. 
which  reduces  to  its  familiar  VNM  form  when  the  aggregator  function  is  linear 
in  its  second  argument,  i.e.,  when  U,,  is  a  constant. 
An  analogous  expression, 
Et 1 
uJJ1,+  1 
R 
Ul, 
!Tr+1  = 
I 
1,  (10) 
applies  to  any  asset  with  rate  of  return  Rk,+l  willingly  held  by  our  representa- 
tive  consumer.  Eq.  (10)  can  be  used,  without  rewriting  the  budget  constraint 
(3)  or  redefining  wealth,  to  price,  in  equilibrium,  any  inside  asset  in  zero  net 
supply. 
To  complete  the  characterization  of  the  optimal  consumption  program,  it 
suffices  to  compute,  from  (3)  and  (5),  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution 
UJJ,,+,/U,,  along  an  optimal  consumption  path.  After  some  tedious  but 
straightforward  computations  (see  the  appendix),  one  finds  that,  for  any  asset 
with  rate  of  return  R,,  which  is  voluntarily  held  and  for  p #  l,*  it  is  the  case 
that 
an  equation  which  holds,  in  particular,  for  the  rate  of  return  on  trees 
(Rk,  =  R,). 
As  Epstein  and  Zin  (1987a)  emphasize,  this  equation  shows  that  the  covari- 
ante  between  the  return  on  asset  k  and  the  return  on  the  market  portfolio’ 
should  be,  in  addition  to  covariance  with  consumption  growth,  a  determinant 
of  excess  returns  -  unless,  of  course,  utility  is  time-  and  state-additive,  in 
‘The  functional  form  of  the  Euler  equation  1s different  when  p =  1;  see  the  appendix  for  detals. 
9R  f+,  stands  in  for  the  rate  of  return  on  the  market  in  this  respectwe  agent  economy  with  only 
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which  case  the  standard  consumption  capital  asset  pricing  model  (C-CAPM) 
obtains.  While  this  observation  can  be  used  to  explain  the  unsatisfactory 
empirical  performance  of the  C-CAPM  relative  to  the  portfolio-based  CAPM,” 
its  general  equilibrium  implications,  which  I  examine  next,  do  not  lend  much 
overall  support  to  the  model  -  in  the  sense  that  the  departure  from  the 
C-CAPM  embodied  in  (11)  does  not  solve  the  equity  premium  puzzle. 
2.3.  Equilibrium  prrces  and  returns 
In  equilibrium,  each  representative  agent  must  hold  one  tree  (remember  the 
normalization  of  section  2.1),  i.e.,  x,  =  1 for  all  t. By Walras’  law,  this  requires, 
from  (2).  that  the  entirety  of  period  t  (perishable)  output  be  consumed  during 
that  period,  so  that 
Turning  first  to  the  determination  of  the  equilibrium  price  of  tree,  and 
proceeding  as  in  Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985),  I  look  for  a  stationary  equilib- 
rium  such  that  pt = w,);  if  the  level  output  at  t  is  yt  and  i  is  the  state  of  state 
of  nature  at  t  (the  realized  rate  of  growth  of  output  between  t -  1 and  t  was 
h,).  Note  that  this  implies  that  the  rate  of  return  on  a  tree  if  state  i  is  realized 
today  and  state  J  tomorrow  is  simply 
p/+1  +Y,+l  w  +1 
R r+1= 
Pt 
=  Lx, 
Y 
(13) 
Inserting  this  expression  into  the  Euler  equation  (11)  and  using  the  market 
clearing  condition  (12)  together  with  the  specification  (1)  of  the  dividend 
process,  one  finds  after  a  few  straightforward  manipulations  that  the  w,‘s 
(i  =  1,.  . . , I  ), which  fully  characterize  equilibrium,  are  the  nonnegative  solu- 
tion,  if  it  exists,”  to  the  following  system  of  1  nonlinear  equations: 
i 
(l-P)/(l--Y) 
w,  =  p  i  Q-q  “I/  +  q’l-y”‘l-p)  I 
for  i=l,...,I. 
/=1 
(14) 
“See  Giovanmm  and  Well  (1988) 
“Some  restrictions  on  tastes  and  technology  are  of  course  necessary  to  ensure  existence.  They 
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The  expected  rate  of  return  on  a  tree  (i.e.,  on  equity)  if  today’s  state  is  i  is 
then  simply,  from  (13), 
w+l 
ER’  =  i  +,,$L 
,=l  w,  . 
I  now  turn  to  the  computation  of  the  risk-free  rate,  RF’,  prevailing  if 
today’s  state  is  i.  The  Euler  equation  (11)  implies  that  the  price  of  a  safe  unit 
of  consumption  tomorrow  if  today’s  state  is  i,  l/RF’,  is 
(16) 
The  (proportional)  equity  premium,  LV =  ER’/RF’,  if  today  state  is  i  is 
thus  simply,  using  (14),  (15)  and  (16), 
: 
I  I 
c +,,qw,  +  1)  c +,,A;‘(  w, +  l)(p--y)‘(l--p) 
=,=  J=l 
J=l 
r  (17) 
1  $L$y  WJ  +  ly)‘(l-) 
J=l 
In  the  absence  of  uncertainty  one  finds,  as  expected,  that  II’  =  1,  i.e.,  that 
the  (conventionally  defined)  net  risk  premium  is  zero.  Notice,  however,  that 
risk  neutrality  for  static  gambles  (y  =  0)  does  not  imply  a  zero  net  risk 
premium  for  the  temporal  one-period  risk  on  trees  unless  utility  is  VNM  and 
p =  y =  0.12 
3.  Kreps-Porteus  preferences  and  asset  pricing  puzzles 
I  now  turn  to  the  implications  of  this  framework  for  the  analysis  of  one  of 
the  most  striking  asset  pricing  puzzles  uncovered  by  the  literature.  In  a 
thought-provoking  paper,  Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985)  showed  that  the 
Arrow-Debreu,  representative  agent  framework  with  time-additive,  CES,  ex- 
pected  utility  preferences  cannot  account,  except  for  unplausibly  high  values 
of  the  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion  (or,  equivalently  in  that  setting, 
extremely  low  values  of  the  elasticity  of  intertemporal  substitution),  for  both 
‘*See Dreze and  Modigham  (1972)  for  an  exploration  of  the  link  between  static  and  temporal 
risk  aversion  in  a  two-period  model,  and  Giovannini  and  Weil  (1989)  for  the  multi-penod 
generalization  of  Dreze  and  Modigliani’s  results  and  their  implications  for  the  term  structure  of 
interest  rates. P.  Wed,  Equity  premium  and  risk-free  rate puzzles  409 
the  average  level  of  the  risk-free  rate  (0.75%)  and  the  discrepancv  (6.20%) 
between  the  average  rates  of  return  on  equity  (6.95%)  and  on  riskless  securities 
during  the  period  1889-1978. 
Mehra  and  Prescott  present  this  puzzle  in  the  illuminating  form  of  a 
dilemma.  In  the  time-additive,  expected  utility  framework  which  they  consider, 
a  very  high  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion  (of  the  order  of  40  or  50)  does 
make  it  possible  to  replicate  the  large  secular  risk  premium  on  equity.  Yet, 
because  a  high  coefficient  or  relative  risk  aversion  is  synonymous  in  that 
framework  with  a  very  low  elasticity  of  intertemporal  substitution  (the  elastic- 
ity  of  intertemporal  substitution  is  constrained  to  be  the  inverse  of  the 
coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion),  it  also  leads  to  the  counterfactual  predic- 
tion  of  an  extremely  high  risk-free  rate!  Conversely,  a  low  coefficient  of 
relative  risk  aversion  leads  to  a counterfactually  low  equity  premium,  although 
it  does  imply  a  relatively  low  risk-free  rate. 
It  thus  might  seem  that  the  major  hurdle  to  be  overcome  in  solving  the 
equity  premium  puzzle  is  a purely  technical  one.  An  independent  parametriza- 
tion  of  the  elasticity  of  intertemporal  substitution  and  of  the  coefficient  of 
relative  risk  aversion  should  provide  the  additional  degree  of  freedom  required 
to  replicate  both  the  level  of  the  risk-free  rate  and  the  discrepancy  between  the 
safe  and  the  average  risky  rates.  The  implicit  reasoning  is,  of  course,  that  the 
risk-free  is  mainly  controlled  by  the  magnitude  of  the  elasticity  of  intertempo- 
ral  substitution,  while  the  risk  premium  is  a  reflection  of  the  coefficient  of 
relative  risk  aversion. 
I  now  demonstrate  -  both  theoretically  for  the  case  of  i.i.d.  dividend  growth 
processes  and  numerically  for  the  non-i.i.d.  case  -  that  the  logical  conclusion 
of  this  (correct)  argument  is  that  separating  risk  aversion  from  intertemporal 
substitution  cannot  provide  a  solution  to  the  equity  premium  puzzle:  instead, 
it  highlights  the  existence  of  a  risk-free  rate  puzzle. 
3.1.  I.i.d.  dividend  growth 
Suppose  that  the  rate  of  growth  of  dividends  is  i.i.d.,  so  that  today’s  state  of 
nature  conveys  no  information  as  to  future  dividends,  and  hence  consumption, 
growth.  l3 The  fruit  price  of  a  tree,  pt,  should  then  be,  relative  to  the  size  y,  of 
the  economy,  a  state-independent  constant.  Formally,  the  assumption  of  i.i.d. 
dividend  growth  is  equivalent,  from  (1)  to  specifying 
9,, = G,  1  Vj,iE{l,...,  I}.  (18) 
It  is  then  obvious,  from  the  equilibrium  asset  pricing  formulae  given  in  (14), 
13As Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985)  note,  this  is  not  a  blatantly  counterfactual  assumption:  the  rate 
of  growth  of  consumption  only  exhibits  a  small  negative  senal  correlation  over  the  period. 410 
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U’,  =  K2’.  Vi. 
The  equilibrium  price  function  is  simply  pt = w);,  where  w  is 
determined  by  substituting  (19)  into  (14);  the  price-dividend 
constant  when  dividend  growth  is  i.i.d. 
09) 
a  constant 
ratio  is  a 
An  immediate  implication  of  (19)  is  that,  with  i.i.d.  dividend  growth,  the 
average  risky  and  safe  rates  are  state-independent  [see  eqs.  (15)  and  (16)]  and 
so  is  the  equity  premium  II’.  Its  constant  magnitude,  denoted  by  17.  is,  using 
eqs.  (17)  to  (19). 
(20) 
From  eq.  (20)  can  be  drawn  an  important  conclusion:  with i.i.d.  drvidend 
growth,  the equity premium,  when defined in relative  terms,  is independent  of  the 
elasticity  of  intertemporal  suhstltution,  and  reflects  only  the  properties  of  the 
dividend  growth  process  and,  of  course,  the  magnitude  of  the  coefficient  of 
relative  risk  aversion.14 
To  understand  this  result,  it  suffices  to  remember  that,  with  i.i.d.  uncer- 
tainty,  optimal  consumption  is  a  constant  fraction  of  wealth.15  The  rate  of 
growth  of  consumption  is,  therefore,  proportional  to  R,+l,  the  rate  of  return 
on  the  market  portfolio  [see  eq.  (3)].  As  a  consequence,  the  marginal  rate  of 
substitution  depends  only  on  R,,,  and  the  Euler  equation  (11)  reduces  to 
(21) 
which  is  the  condition  characterizing  the  static  optimal  portfolio  allocation 
chosen  by  an  agent  with  a  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion  equal  to  y!  Eq. 
(21)  simply  establishes  l6  that  the  intertemporal  program  reduces,  in  practice, 
t4Analogous  results  have  been  obtamed  by  Barsky  (1986)  wtthm  a  two-penod  framework  based 
on  Selden’s  (1978)  ordinal  certainty  eqmvalence  preferences 
“Preferences  are  homothettc  -  so  that  the  ratio  of  consumption  to  wealth  depends,  at  most,  on 
the  state  of  nature  Dividend  growth  is  i.t.d.,  so  that  this  ratio  (equal  to  the  marginal  und  average 
propensity  to  consume)  1s a  constant  -  because  today’s  state  of  nature  conveys  no  mformatlon  as 
to  the  future. 
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to  a  sequence  of  disconnected  static  problems  when  underlying  uncertainty  is 
i i d  l7  But  then  it  is  not  surprising  that,  as  eq.  (20)  shows,  the  risk  premium  on  . .  . 
equity  depends  only  (for  a  given  output  process)  on  y,  and  that  p  is 
irrelevant  -  since  intertemporal  considerations  play  no  role  in  the  determina- 
tion  of  the  optimal  program  with  i.i.d.  uncertainty. 
While  this  result  confirms  the  intuitive  argument  presented  supru  (the 
coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion  controls  the  risk  premium  and  the  elasticity 
of  intertemporal  substitution  controls  the  level  of  the  risk-free  rate),  it  also 
proves  that  relaxing  the  time-additive  expected  utility  restriction  cannot  possi- 
bly  help  solve  the  Mehra-Prescott  equity  premium  puzzle  when  dividend 
growth  is  i.i.d.  For  any  y,  the  equity  premium  is  the  same  irrespective  of 
whether  p  is  equal  to  or  different  from  y  -  i.e.,  irrespective  of  whether  the 
expected,  time-additive  utility  restriction  is  satisfied  or  not!  Therefore,  allow- 
ing  attitudes  toward  risk  to  be  parametrized  independently  from  behavior 
towards  intertemporal  substitution  cannot,  with  i.i.d.  dividend  growth,  afford 
any  improvement  whatsoever  over  the  results  of  Mehra  and  Prescott:  indepen- 
dently  of  the  value  one  might  want  to  select  for  p  (the  inverse  of  the  elasticity 
of  intertemporal  substitution),  one  will  still  need  implausibly  (of  the  order  of 
40)  high  values  of  y  {the  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion)  to  replicate  the 
observed  6.20%  risk  premium  on  equity.  The  equity  premium  puzzle  (‘why  is 
the  risk  premium  so  large  if  consumers  are  only  moderately  risk-averse?‘)  thus 
remains  intact. 
Another  implication  of  the  foregoing  results  is  that  relaxing,  with  i.i.d. 
uncertainty  and  for  a  given  y,  the  time-additive,  expected  utility  restriction  in 
the  direction  of  more  plausible  values  might,  while  leaving  the  equity  premium 
unchanged,  deteriorate  the  ability  of  the  model  to  replicate  the  level  of  the 
risk-free  rate.  It  is  commonly  estimated  that  the  coefficient  of  relative  risk 
aversion  is  in  the  range  of  1  to  5,  with  both  theoretical  [Arrow  (1965)]  and 
empirical  [Epstein  and  Zin  (1987b),  Giovannini  and  Weil  (1988)]  grounds  for 
thinking  that  it  is  in  fact  closer  to  1.  The  implied  value  for  the  elasticity  of 
intertemporal  substitution  under  the  expected,  time-additive  utility  restriction, 
0.2  to  1,  runs  counter  to  the  belief  that  consumers  are  in  fact  very  averse  to 
intertemporal  substitution,  and  thus  seems  to  overestimate  the  ‘ true’  intertem- 
poral  elasticity  of  substitution  (i.e.,  underestimate  the  ‘true’  p).  But  it  is  easy 
to  show  [from  (16)  and  the  assumption  of  i.i.d.  growth]  that  increasing  p while 
maintaining  y  fixed  may  very  well  result,  depending  on  the  specification  of  the 
output  process,  in  an  increase  in  the  predicted  risk-free  rate  far  over  and  above 
the  already  too  high  levels  associated  with  the  expected  utility  restriction! 
The  following  section  confirms  and  amplifies  these  results  by  turning  to  a 
numerical  examination  of  the  non-i.i.d.  case. 
“See  Giovannmi  and  Wed  (1988)  for  an  elaboration  of  this  and  other  related  mues. 412  P. Werl. Equzty  pretmum and rrsk-free rate puzzles 
3.2.  Non-i.  i. d.  dividend  growth  process 
As  the  nonlinear  nature  of  eq.  (14)  makes  clear,  one  has  to  resort  to 
numerical  methods  to  solve  for  the  equilibrium  price  function,  as  summarized 
by  the  u;‘s,  when  the  dividend  growth  process  is  not  i.i.d. 
Mehra  and  Prescott  observe  that  the  evolution  of  the  rate  of  growth  of 
aggregate  consumption  (and  thus,  in  this  model,  dividends)  is  well  approxi- 
mated,  over  the  period  1889-1978,  by  a  two-state  stochastic  process: 
A, =  1.054,  h,  =  0.984, 
with  transition  probabilities 
+it  =  +** =  0.43,  @Ii2  =  $21 =  0.57. 
(22) 
(23) 
These  magnitudes  are  used  to  solve  for  the  W~‘S  in  (14)  as  well  as  for  the 
state-dependent  riskless  and  expected  risky  rates. 
The  Markov  process  in  (22)-(23)  has  a probability  @ =  [l  -  $,,]/[2  -  (ptl  - 
+z2]  =  i  of  being  in  the  good  state,  A,,  in  the  long  run.  Given  the  three 
parameters  p,  y,  and  p  which  parametrize,  respectively,  consumers’  attitudes 
toward  impatience,  risk,  and  intertemporal  substitution,  this  ergodic  probabil- 
ity,  @, can  be  used,  as  in  Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985)  to  compute  the  long-run 
average  risk-free  rate,  RF  =  @RF'  +  (1  -  @)RF2,  and  the  long-run  average 
equity  premium,  IT =  @LTI’  +  (1 -  @)n2,  which  are  implied  by  the  model. 
Tables  1  and  2  report  the  average  long-run  risk  premia  and  risk-free 
rate  -  for  selected  values  of  l/p  between  l/45  and  infinity  and  y  between  0 
and  45  -  for  the  cases  j? =  0.95  and  0.98.  The  result  are  as  distressing  for  the 
representative  agent,  complete  market  models  as  are  Mehra  and  Prescott’s. 
Under  the  expected  time-additive  utility  restriction  p =  y,‘*  decreasing  the 
intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  amounts  to  increasing  the  coefficient  of 
relative  risk  aversion,  and  results  in  the  simultaneous  rise  of  the  risk  premium 
and  the  risk-free  rate  -  a  property  at  the  origin  of  the  dilemma  faced  by 
Mehra  and  Prescott.  There  is  no  way  to  fit  both  the  level  of  the  risk-free  rate 
and  the  risk  premium  when  the  VNM  restrictions  is  imposed.  If  one  wants  to 
replicate  the  low  observed  secular  risk-free  rate,  one  needs  to  assume  that  the 
elasticity  of  intertemporal  substitution  is  extremely  large  (by  moving  up  the 
diagonal);  but  then  agents  are  almost  risk-neutral  and  the  model  cannot 
explain  why  the  risk  premium  is  so  high.  If  one  wants  to  fit  the  risk  premium 
(by  moving  down  the  diagonal),  one  needs  a coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion 
of  around  20:  but  the  very  small  elasticity  of  intertemporal  substitution  which 
lXThe  correspondmg  entries  are  read  along  the  NW-SE  diagonal  of  the  tables. P.  Wed,  Eqtq  premum  and risk-free  rate puzles  413 
Table  1 
Net risk premium and net risk-free ratea (/3 = 0.95) 
EIS  CRRA  (u) 
l/P)  0  0.5  1  5  10  20  45 
m  0 00  0.05  0.10 
5.25  5.24  5.21 
2  0.01  006  0.11 
6.20  6.16  6.12 
1  001  0.07  012 
7.14  7.08  7.03 
0.2  0.10  0.18  0 26 
15.02  14.81  14.61 
0.1  0.24  0.35  0.45 
25.73  25.32  24.96 
0.05  0 56  0 72  0 87 
50.51  49.55  48.61 
l/45  1.13  1.36  1.60 
138.91  135.56  132.25 
0.48  0.94  1 17 
5.01  4.78  4.40 
0.51  101  1.89 
5.79  5.40  4.73 
0.55  1.08  2.00 
6.56  6.02  5.06 
0 88  1.64  2 91 
13.02  11.11  7.75 
1.31  2.33  4.04 
21.68  17.87  11.23 
2.12  3 66  6.25 
41.26  32.80  18.65 
3.58  6.22  11.22 












-  2.23 
17.11 
-  9.22 










Table  2 
Net risk premium and net risk-free ratea (/3 = 0.98) 
CRRA  (7) 
0  0.5  1  5  10  20  45 
0.00  005  0.09  0.47  0.93  1.76  3 00 
2.94  2.02  1.99  1.80  1.58  1.21  0.91 
0.01  0.06  .  0.11  0.51  1.00  1.88  3 13 
2.95  2.91  2.87  2.55  2.17  1.53  0.75 
0.01  007  0 12  0.55  1 07  2 00  3 27 
3.86  3.81  3.75  3.31  2.77  1.85  0.59 
0.10  0.18  0.26  0 89  1.65  2.93  4 37 
11.49  11.29  11.10  9.56  7.12  4.4s  -0.68 
025  036  047  1.33  2 37  4 10  5.79 
21.87  21.47  21.08  17.9s  14.26  7.83  -  2.24 
0.59  0.75  0.89  2.18  3 73  6 37  8 82 
45.89  44.95  43.98  36.92  28.72  15.01  -  5.22 
119  142  1.66  3.70  6 40  11.50  17.53 
131.52  128.87  125.96  101.02  75.11  36.96  -  12.00 
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this  magnitude  implies  under  the  restriction  p =  y  yields  a  much  too  large 
risk-free  rate  (at  least  15%)! 
Relaxing  the  restriction  p =  y  clearly  does  eliminate,  as  hypothesized  above. 
this  dilemma.  For  any  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  l/p,  increasing 
the  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion  y  raises  the  risk  premium  and  lowers 
the  risk-free  rate.  For  any  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion  y,  decreasing  the 
intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  raises  the  risk-free  rate  and  the  risk 
premium.  l9  For  given  p  and  y,  an  increase  in  p  from  95%  to  98%  has  almost 
no  effect  on  the  risk  premium  but,  of  course,  decreases  the  risk-free  rate  by 
approximately  3%,.“O 
One  can  exploit  these  properties  to  fit  almost  perfectly  both  the  level  of  the 
risk-free  rate  and  the  risk  premium  on  equity.  For  instance,  choosing  a  very 
high  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion  (around  45)  and  an  elasticity  of 
intertemporal  substitution  not  as  small  as  the  VNM  would  imply  (around  0.10 
instead  of  l/45  =  0.022)  results,  for  p  =  0.95,  in  a  risk  premium  of  5.72%  and 
a  risk-free  rate  of  0.85%!” 
While  this  clearly  constitutes  an  improvement  over  what  the  Mehra- 
Prescott  model  with  VNM  utility  could  achieve,  it  is  clear  that  this  purported 
fit  relies  on  an  implausibly  high  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion.  For  more 
realistic  configurations  of  the  parameters,  the  numbers  in  tables  1  and  2 
suggest  instead  that  our  representative  agent,  complete  markets  setup  is unable 
to  replicate  the  historical  rates  of  return.  If,  for  instance,  one  assumes  that  the 
coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion  is  equal  to  122  and  the  elasticity  of 
intertemporal  substitution  is equal  to  0.1, 23 the  model  predicts  a risk  premium 
of  0.45%  (instead  of  6.2%)  and  a  risk-free  rate  between  20%  and  25%  (instead 
of  0.75%)! 
This  failure  of  the  model  is,  in  fact,  more  serious  than  when  the  VNM 
restriction  was  imposed.  It  cannot  be  attributed  anymore  to  the  inability  to 
control  the  levels  of  and  the  discrepancy  between  rates  independently  -  since 
KP  preferences  lift  this  restriction  and  there  is  no  dilemma  anymore.  It  is  now 
“While  the  explanatton  of  the  first  effect  ts  straightforward  m  each  of  these  two  comparative 
statics  general  equilibrium  experiments,  the  rattonale  of  the  second  result  is  more  obscure  These 
results  are  moreover  not  independent  of  the  specification  of  the  output  process. 
““A  larger  B  stgnals  less  impattence.  htgher  savmgs,  and  thus  results  m  a  lower  equihbrium 
nsk-free  rate 
lt1  do  not  allow  for  values  of  /3  above  1  -  i.e.,  a  negative  subjective  discount  rate  -  although 
this  1s what  one  would  find  if  one  were  to  try  to  estimate  /3. Analogously,  in  a  Blanchard  (1985) 
model  with  stochasttc  lifetimes.  estimates  of  the  condttional  death  probabrhty  are  almost  always 
negative  -  because  thev  decrease  the  effective  subjective  discount  rate.  A  value  of  B  above  1 or  a 
negative  death  probability  are  a  computer’s  solution  of  the  risk-free  rate  puzzle! 
‘“See  suprcr  for  the  theoretical  and  empirical  rationale  of  this  choice.  The  argument  also  goes 
through  with.  say,  y  =  3. 
‘3Thts  is  Hall’s  (1988)  estimate,  as  well  as  Campbell  and  Mankiw’s  (1989). P.  Wed.  Equrty premrum  and risk-free  rate puzhs  415 
to  be  ascribed  to  two much  more  basic  facts: 
*  there  is  not  enough  individual  consumption  riskz4  in  this  economy  to 
explain  why,  if agents  are only  moderately  risk-averse,  the  risk premium  is 
so high; 
l  the  average  rate  of growth  of individual  consumption  is too  high  (1.8% per 
year)  to  be  consistent,  if  agents  are  extremely  averse  to  intertemporal 
substitution,  with  the  very  low risk-free  rate. 
There  are,  therefore,  two  distinct  puzzles,  which  Mehra  and  Prescott  could 
not  clearly  distinguish  because  of the restriction  on preferences  which  they  had 
imposed:  the  equity  premium  puzzle  (H&Y  is the risk predict  so high?) and  the 
risk-free  rate  puzzle  (why  the risk-free rate so iow?). 
The  latter  puzzle  is,  of  course,  already  apparent  (but  cannot  be  easily 
int~~reted)  when  the VNM  restriction  is imposed:  for p = 0.98 and  p = y = 1. 
the  predicted  safe  rate  is 4%. But it is made  much  starker  when  the elasticity  of 
intertemporal  substitution  is allowed  to decrease  from  the  relatively  high  level 
implied  by  the  VNM  restriction  towards  smaller  and  more  realistic  values,  as 
the  safe  rate  increases  very  rapidly  when  l/p  declines. 
3.3.  Robustness 
The  conclusion  that  there  is both  an equity  premium  puzzle  and  a risk-free 
rate  puzzle  is robust,  as were  Mehra  and  Prescott’s  original  results,  to  modifi- 
cations  of  the  output  growth  process  which  maintain  its first  two moments  set 
at  their  historical  vafues.  This  is  hardly  surprising  as,  loosely  speaking,  the 
risk-free  rate  puzzle  has  to do with  the  average  rate  of  growth  of consumption 
and  the  equity  premium  puzzle  with  its variability. 
It is not  robust  to the introduction  of extremely  catastrophic2s  scenarios  B la 
Rietz  (1988).  but  survives,  for  reasonable  degrees  of  risk  aversion.  the  intro- 
duction  of  mildly  disastrous  states  of  nature  -  as  do  Mehra  and  Prescott’s 
results.26 
An  often  raised  question  is whether  the  claims  being  priced  correspond  to 
the  names  being  attached  to  them:  is ‘equity’  truly  equity?  Within  the  confine 
of  the  model.  yes. 
Is the  exchange  economy  assumption  constraining?  No,  in the  sense  that,  as 
Mehra  (1987)  has  shown,  the  set  of  equilibrium  asset  returns  obtained  in  a 
production  economy  is included  in  the  set  of  equilibrium  returns  computed 
from  an  exchange  economy.  Yes,  however.  in  the  sense  that  the  model  is 
“4The  appropriate  measure  of  risk  is  the  one  implied  by  the  Euler  equatlon  (11) 
“And,  m  my  view,  somewhat  absurd 
%ee  their  (1988)  rejomder  to  Rietz,  whxh  applies,  after  suitable  rn~i~eatl~ns  of  preferences. 
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calibrated  by  assuming  that  aggregate  dividends  are  equal  to  aggregate  con- 
sumption  of  nondurables  and  services  -  a  somewhat  arbitrary  and  not  incon- 
sequential  choice. 
The  assumption  that  the  economy  is  closed  to  foreign  trade  is restrictive,  for 
it  imposes  that  consumption  be  equal  to  domestic  output  -  which  clearly 
needs  not  be  the  case  in  a  multi-country  world. 
Is  the  assumption  of  generalized  isoelastic  utility  constraining?  It  is,  for 
recent  work  by  Constantinides  (1987)  suggests  that  habit  formation  prefer- 
ences  (which  yields  time-nonseparable  but  state-separable  representation  of 
tastes)  replicate  first  moments  (but  not  second  moments)  of  asset  returns  much 
more  satisfactorily. 
4.  Conclusion 
This  paper  has  studied  the  implications  for  general  equilibrium  asset  pricing 
of  a  recently  introduced  class  of  Kreps-Porteus  nonexpected  utility  prefer- 
ences,  which  is  characterized  by  a constant  intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitu- 
tion  and  a  constant,  but  unrelated,  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion. 
It  has  been  shown  that  the  solution  to  the  equity  premium  puzzle  docu- 
mented  by  Mehra  and  Prescott  (1985)  cannot  be  found  by  simply  separating 
risk  aversion  for  intertemporal  substitution.  If  the  dividend  growth  process  is 
i.i.d.,  the  risk  premium,  when  appropriately  defined,  is  independent  of  the 
intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution,  and  thus  is  the  same  whether  or  not 
the  time-additive,  expected  utility  restriction  is  imposed.  When  the  dividend 
growth  process  is  non-i.i.d.,  relaxing  the  parametric  restriction  on  tastes 
imposed  by  the  time-additive,  expected  utility  specification  adds,  for  plausible 
parameter  values,  a  risk-free  rate  puzzle  to  Mehra  and  Prescott’s  equity 
premium  puzzle. 
In  the  search  for  a  solution  to  these  puzzles,  one  could  relax  some  of  the 
simplifying  assumptions  pointed  out  in  the  previous  section:  this  clearly 
cannot  but  improve  the  fit  of  the  model.  Nevertheless,  the  empirical  potential 
of  such  modifications  pales,  in  my  view,  before  the  extreme  restrictiveness  of 
two  other  fundamental  tenets  of  the  model:  the  existence  of  a  representative 
agent  and  the  assumption  of  complete  Arrow-Debreu  security  markets. 
As  first  hinted  by  Mehra  and  Prescott,  and  as  confirmed  by  some  recent 
results,27  introducing  heterogeneity  between  agents  in  the  form  of  undiversifi- 
able  individual  consumption  risk  goes  a long  way  towards  explaining  both  the 
equity  premium  and  risk-free  rate  puzzles.  If  individual  consumption  is  more 
risky  than  aggregate  consumption,  one  can  explain  why  the  risk  premium  is 
large  even  though  agents  are  only  moderately  risk-averse  in  the  aggregate.  At 
the  same  time,  the  price  a  consumer  will  be  willing  to  pay  for  a  safe  unit  of 
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consumption  tomorrow  will  rise  -  i.e.,  the  risk-free  rate  will  decrease.  There- 
fore,  the  existence  of  heterogeneity  and  of  market  imperfections  is  likely  to 
hold  center  stage  in  the  explanation  of  the  equity  premium  and  risk-free  rate 
puzzles. 
Appendix  A:  Euler  equation  and outline  of  the  numerical  solution 
This  appendix  derives  eq.  (11)  in  the  text  for  the  case  p #  1,  outlines  the 
pecularities  of  the  case  p =  1, and  sketches  the  procedure  used  to  numerically 
solve  the  model.28 
A. 1.  General  case  (p  #  1) 
We  need  to  compute  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution, 
M,  =  ~2*~,,+,/~,,1  (A.1) 
and  to  prove  that  it  can  be  written  as  in  eq.  (11). 
Because  of  the  homogeneity  properties  of  the  aggregator  function,  of  the 
interpretation  of  y  as  the  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion,  and  of  the  fact 
that  preferences  are  isoelastic,  guess  that  the  value  function  can  be  written  in 
the  form 
A(h)w’-Y-  1 
T/(w,h)=  (l-p)(I_+  64.2) 
where  A(.  )  is  an  unknown  function,  and  that  the  consumption  function  is 
linear  in  wealth: 
where  p( A,)  is  the  state-dependent  marginal  propensity  to  consume.  It  is  easy 
to  show,  performing  the  maximization  called  for  by  (6),  that  the  functions 
A(  .)  and  p(  .)  are  related  by  the  following  two  conditions: 
and 
(1 -  P)[PL(&)l  -p= Pm-  PO,)1  -p  (A-4) 
A(A,)  =  (1  _  p)(l-Y)/(iLP)[P(Xr)]  -PKwA-P)l, 
(A4 
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where  4=  %{A(~,+l)[R,+lI  -  >  ’  Y c1  -P)/(l  -y).  The  solution  to  these  functional 
equations  is  closed  in  only  a  few  cases. 
Using  the  budget  constraint  (3)  along  with  (A.3)  (A.4).  and  (AS)  imply 
that,  along  an  optimal  program, 
/j(l-Y)/(l-P) 
(1  y)/(l--P)  c,,1 
[  1 
PN-Y)/(l--P)l 
A;h,+,)R:;:  =  p  -  c, 
R$Y)/(~-P).  (~.6) 
an  expression  which  will  be  used  infra. 
From  (5)  it  is  straightforward  to  show  that  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution 
defined  in  (A.1)  is 
(A.71 
where  y+  1 denotes  the  value  function  evaluated  at  ( w~+~, A,,,).  Using  the 




V  lil  &,+,)R:;:  ’  (A-8) 
so  that,  substituting  (A.6)  and  (A.8)  into  (A.7)  we  find  that 
R[#t;:)/(l-P)l--l  (A.9) 
an  expression  which,  inserted  in  (lo),  yields  the  Euler  equation  (11). 
Given  the  specification  in  (1)  of  a  discrete  state  space,  this  Euler  equation 
yields,  in  equilibrium,  Z equations  in  the  Z  unknown  price-dividend  ratios 
(the  w,‘s).  This  (in  general  nonlinear)  system  of  equations  must  be  solved 
numerically. 
The  special  case  of  a  unit  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion  can  be  dealt 
with  by  directly  setting  y =  1 (or,  when  necessary,  using  de  1’Hospital’s  rule)  in 
the  above  equations. 
A.2.  Unit elasticity  of intertemporal  substitution 
For  a unit  elasticity  of  intertemporal  substitution,  the  functional  form  of  the 
consumer’s  Euler  equation  is  not  the  one  given  in  eq.  (11)  and  the  solution 
procedure  therefore  differs  slightly  from  what  was  outlined  above.  In  the P.  Wed,  Equity prenuum  and risk-free  rate puzzles  419 
general  case,  we  could  avoid  solving  the  functional  equation  for  the  value 
function,  but  needed  to  use  a  numerical  procedure  to  obtain  (for  non-i.i.d. 
uncertainty)  the  price-dividend  ratios  -  i.e.,  the  w,‘s.  When  p =  1.  the  reverse 
obtains:  we  can  always  write  the  equilibrium  price  function  for  trees  explicitly; 
to  price  other  assets,  however,  one  needs  to  solve  the  functional  equation  for 
the  value  function  numerically. 
When  p =  1,  the  recursive  representation  of  preferences  becomes  [applying 
de  1’Hospital’s  rule  to  the  aggregator  function  (5)] 
cjl-P)(‘-y)(E,~+,)‘-  1 
(1  -Y)(l  -P)  . 
(A.lO) 
The  value  function  can  be  written  as  in  (A.2).  One  can  check  that  the 
consumption  function  is  simply 
c,=  (1  -P)w,,  (A.ll) 
and  that  A ( .)  solves  the  following  functional  equation: 
A(h)  =BIW(X,,,)R:,:lp,  (A.12) 
where 
B  =  (1  _  ,fj)(1-‘-y)p8(1-~). 
Since  market  clearing  requires  w, = pt + y,  and  c, = y,,  eq.  (A.ll)  implies  that 
the  equilibrium  price  of  a  tree  is 
P 
PI=  l_  pJ+  (A.13) 
With  a  unit  elasticity  of  intertemporal  substitution  and  irrespective  of  the 
value  of  the  coefficient  of  relative  risk  aversion,  the  price-dividend  ratio  is 
constant,  independent  of  the  specification  of  the  output  process,  and  ‘myopic’. 
This  property  was  first  pointed  out  by  Epstein  (1988). 
The  equilibrium  rate  of  return  on  tree  is  then  simply 
R 1+1= 
pt+1  +yt+1  = pA,+,_ 
Pt 
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Inserting  this  expression  into  the  functional  equation  (A.12).  and  using  the 
assumption  of  a  finite  state  space,  one  obtains  a  system  of  I  (in  general 
nonlinear)  equations  in  the  I  unknowns  A,  = A(  A,),  which  must  be  solved 
numerically. 
To  compute  the  equilibrium  risk-free  rate  29 it  suffices  to  then  note  that  eqs. 
(3)  (7).  (A.2),  and  (A.14)  imply  that 
so  that  the  equilibrium  risk-free  rate  in  state  i is 
The  risk  premium  in  state  i  is  thus  simply 
(A.15) 
(~.i6) 
(A-  17) 
c  +,J”J-  yA, 
J=l 
This  expression  is  formally  similar  to  eq.  (17),  and  identical  to  eq.  (20)  in  the 
i.i.d.  case.  It  can,  in  fact,  be  derived  by  directly  applying  de  1’Hospital’s  rule  to 
eqs.  (14)  and  (17)  although  the  roundabout  procedure  followed  here  is  both 
simpler  and  more  illuminating  economically. 
There  is,  therefore,  no  discontinuity  in  the  solution  at  p =  1:  the  limit  of  the 
risk  premium  obtained  when  p +  1  by  using  the  algorithm  designed  for  the 
case  p #  1 is  the  same  as  the  solution  obtained  using  the  algorithm  constructed 
for  the  case  p  =  1. The  latter  numerical  procedure  is  simply  more  efficient  and 
converges  faster. 
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